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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN D. WATSON, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs . : 
: Case No. 960344-CA 
CAMILLE K. WATSON, : 
: Priority No. 15 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from an Order Terminating Alimony and 
Requiring Sale of Marital Home of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Utah County, Judge Howard H. Maetani presiding. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (i) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
a. Whether the trial court committed error in finding that 
Camille K. Watson, the defendant/appellant, had cohabited with 
Jerry Talbot within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) 
(Supp. 1995) and the case of Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 
1985). The issue of whether a party has cohabited is a mixed 
question of fact and law, and the appellate court is not bound by 
the conclusion of the trial court, Haddow, 707 P.2d at 671, 
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citing Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586 n.l (Utah 1982). In 
addition, an appellate court is vested with broad equitable 
powers in reviewing a trial court's actions in a divorce case, 
Haddow, 707 P.2d at 671, citing Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872-3 
(Utah 1979). 
b. Whether the trial court committed error in ordering 
that plaintiff/appellee's alimony obligation be terminated 
retroactively to January 1, 1995. This is again a mixed question 
of fact and law, and the applicable standard is cited supra. 
The appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal in the trial 
court, preserving the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and order for appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-5(9) (Supp. 1995) 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the 
party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabiting with another person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case presented on appeal is a divorce action. The 
appellant, Camille Watson, was the defendant in the case below. 
John Watson is the appellee and was the plaintiff below. The 
Decree of Divorce was entered on November 12, 1992. The parties 
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had three minor children, and the parties were granted joint 
legal custody, with Camille Watson being the primary custodial 
parent, subject to John Watson's reasonable and liberal rights of 
visitation. Camille Watson was awarded the marital home, subject 
to certain conditions subsequent or triggering events. Those 
conditions are, (a) Camille Watson remarries or cohabits with any 
other person, (b) the youngest child reaches age eighteen, or 
Camille Watson moves from the residence. 
John Watson filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause on or 
about November 27, 1995, alleging that Camille Watson had been 
cohabiting with Mr. Jerry Talbot. John Watson requested an order 
terminating alimony payment and enforcing the provisions of the 
Decree of Divorce regarding disposition of the marital home. An 
evidentiary hearing on John Watson's motion was held before the 
Honorable Howard H. Maetani on February 1, 1996. At the close of 
evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement. 
Additionally, the Court requested counsel to submit proposed 
findings of fact within fifteen days. The trial court issued a 
memorandum decision on April 8, 1996, and signed the Order, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May 2, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Trial Court's Summary of Evidence Presented at Trial 
The trial court precedes its Findings of Fact with a section 
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entitled "Evidence Presented At Trial," which is a summary of the 
testimony of testimony and other evidence presented at trial. 
The section begins with the testimony of Robert N. Goode, a 
private investigator hired by John Watson. The trial court found 
that Mr. Goode performed surveillance and other investigatory 
work on Camille Watson's home at 1668 North 390 West Pleasant 
Grove, Utah, beginning on December 17, 1994. This finding is 
supported in the record at T.15 1.17; T.18 2. 6. The trial court 
found that Mr. Goode personally conducted surveillance on Camille 
Watson's home from December 17, 1994, through early February, 
1995, that a stationary video surveillance system was used from 
February through April, 1995, that from April, 1995 through 
October, 1995, Mr. Goode conducted random checks on Camille 
Watson's house, and that a stationary video surveillance system 
was again used from October to November, 1995, when Mr. Goode 
ceased surveillance activities. This finding is supported by 
T.15 1.17; T.18 1. 6. The trial court found that Mr. Goode had 
performed a "skip trace" on Jerry Talbot and that trace indicated 
Mr. Talbot's principal domicile and residence was Camille 
Watson's home. This finding is not well supported by the record. 
Mr. Goode did testify that in his opinion, Mr. Talbot was living 
in Camille Watson's home from approximately December 1994 until 
November of 1995 (T.39 11.4-11), but evidence of a "skip trace" 
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was objected to by Camille Watson's counsel for lack of 
foundation, and that objection was sustained {T.17 11. 4-19). 
The trial court found that "Mr. Goode testified that he 
personally witnessed Mr. Talbot spending the night with Camille 
Watson in Pleasant Grove and not at any other address, including 
that of Mr. Talbot's mother in West Valley City." Mr. Goode did 
testify that he observed Mr. Talbot staying the night and leave 
the next morning having changed clothes (T.24). The trial court 
also found that Mr. Goode had traveled to Mr. Talbot's mother's 
home in West Valley City once or twice a week during January to 
March, 1995, and that he neither observed Mr. Talbot nor his car 
at that residence. This is supported at T.62 1.1 to T.63 1.5. 
The trial court also stated that Mr. Goode testified that 
Mr. Talbot was present at the residence located at 1668 North 3 90 
West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, which is Camille Watson's residence, 
each night that he personally surveilled the residence. This is 
supported by Mr. Goode's testimony at T.18 1.20. However, it 
became clear in cross-examination that Mr. Goode was not 
testifying that Mr. Talbot spent the night at Camille Watson's 
home each night Mr. Goode surveilled the residence, and further 
that Mr. Goode was not sure he saw Mr. Talbot at Camille Watson's 
residence on each night he personally surveilled the residence. 
(Beginning at T.50 1.23 to T.57 1.22, generally.) Specifically, 
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Mr. Goode testified upon cross-examination that it could be 
correct that the video tapes he took showed no sign of Mr. Talbot 
on January 5, 1995 (T.50 1.23 to T.51 1.3), January 24 {T.53 
11.12-15), January 25 (T.53 11.16-18). Mr. Goode's responses to 
questioning about whether the videos showed Mr. Talbot present on 
January 18 {T.51 11.18-25), January 21 {T.52 11.2-7), January 23 
(T.53 11.6-11), and January 26 (T.53 11.19-22) were either non-
responsive or equivocal. Mr. Goode testified that he could not 
dispute the fact that there was no evidence of Mr. Talbot on 
February 3, 1995 (T.54 11.8-10). Mr. Goode also testified in 
cross-examination that there were no video tapes for February 3rd 
to February 21(T. 54 11.11-21) . Mr. Goode admitted that the 
tapes showed that Mr. Talbot left Camille Watson's at 8:38 p.m. 
(T.54 1.24 - T.55 1.1), and that Mr. Talbot was not there on 
February 28 (T.55 11.2-6). Mr. Goode also testified that Mr. 
Talbot was not present on March 7 through 10 (T.56 11.11-20) . 
Furthermore, Mr. Goode admitted making mistakes either on the 
dates of the videos, or in his notes. (T. 54 1.22.), and to 
admitted to making selective notes only on the dates that showed 
Mr. Talbot at Camille Watson's residence, omitting dates where 
the videotapes did not show Mr. Talbot (T.55 11.4-14). 
The next reference to Mr. Goode's testimony in the trial 
court's findings at R.243 is that Mr. Goode had observed Mr. 
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Talbot entering and leaving Camille Watson's residence having 
changed clothes, which is supported at T.24 11.7-15, but also 
found that Mr. Goode had testified that he observed Mr. Talbot 
changing clothes in Camille Watson's master bedroom on one 
occasion, but this is not supported by the record. The trial 
court also found that Mr. Goode testified that he observed Mr. 
Talbot present in the master bedroom with Camille Watson, and 
observed Mr. Talbot follow Mrs. Watson into the master bathroom, 
which is supported at T.41 11.6-20. 
At R.242 ^6 the trial court found that Mr. Goode observed 
Mr. Talbot use a garage door opener to obtain access to Camille 
Watson's residence (supported at T.20 11.6-10); work on his car 
in the garage at the residence (supported at T.20 11.22-24); use 
Camille Watson's car frequently (supported at T.23 11.19-25); 
arrive and leave from the residence when Camille Watson was not 
present (partially supported at T.31 1.19-T.32 1.9); clean the 
garage (supported in the record); do yard work at the home 
(supported at T.41 1.25); enter the home without knocking 
(supported at T.26 11.1-3; T.20 11.2-10); return late at night 
when all the lights in the home were off (recorded in the video 
but not personally observed, T.25 11.19-25) ; carry groceries into 
the home {T.37 11.3-5); carry a duffel bag and wight belt into 
the home and return to the car without the duffel bag (T.37 
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11.10-25). The trial court also found that Mr. Goode testified 
that he observed children other than the Watson children at 
Camille Watson's home every other weekend on a regular basis. 
While Mr. Goode testified that "there were some dark-haired 
children that would come every other weekend" (T.32 11.15-16) 
there was no testimony other than that to establish the 
regularity of the visits by the other children. 
At R.242 %7 the trial court further summarized Mr. Goode's 
testimony. The trial court found that Mr. Goode testified he 
went to Mr. Talbot's former residence in Wendover, Utah and spoke 
to an apartment manager who informed Mr. Goode that Mr. Talbot 
had left the address at 1668 North 390 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah 
as his forwarding address. Mr. Goode did testify that he went to 
Wendover to check on Mr. Talbot's former residence (T.35 1.11-
T.37 1.2), but the trial court also sustained an objection to 
hearsay testimony from the apartment manager regarding a 
forwarding address, so the trial court erred in stating that the 
former manager had informed Mr. Gcode of Mr. Talbot's forwarding 
address. The trial court also found that Mr. Goode found several 
pieces of mail in the trash showing that Mr. Talbot was using the 
Pleasant Grove address as his mailing residence. However, Mr. 
Goode performed around twenty trash searches (T.61 1.12), and 
found only two pieces of regular mail addressed to Mr. Talbot. 
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T.27 1.15-T.28 1.4; Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 4. Mr. Goode 
testified that he also found some "junk" mail, but it was not 
produced at trial and no good explanation was offered for the 
failure to do so. T.60 1.16-T.61 1.4; T.68 11.5-24. 
Also at R.242 ^7 the trial court found that Mr. Goode 
testified that he contacted Mr. Talbot's former employer, and was 
informed that Mr. Talbot was using the Pleasant Grove address on 
his W-2 form and as a forwarding address. At T.30 11.17-22 Mr. 
Goode testified about the W-2 statement, but never testified that 
Mr. Talbot left Camille Watson's address as his forwarding 
address with his former employer. 
At R.242 *j\8 the trial court found that Mr. Goode gave his 
opinion that Mr. Talbot was living in Camille Watson's home from 
approximately December 1994 to November 1995. This is supported 
at T.38 1.7-T.39 1.11, but Camille Watson's counsel objected to 
the opinion testimony. The objection was overruled on the basis 
that Mr. Goode's opinion goes to the weight of the testimony. 
Id. 
John Watson's next witness was R. Craig Hilton, who lives 
across the street from Camille Watson. The trial court 
summarized his testimony at R.241-240. The trial court stated 
that Mr. Hilton testified that he lives across the street from 
Camille Watson (supported at T.73 11.9-20), and that he has full 
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view of the Watson residence. This latter statement is not 
specifically supported by the record, since John Watson's counsel 
struck his question asking if Mr. Hilton had a full view of the 
Watson home and it was not responded to. T.74 11.3-6. The trial 
court next states that Mr. Hilton testified that he met Mr. 
Talbot two years ago (from the hearing date) at Camille Watson's 
home (supported in the record at T.74 11.3-18) , and that Mr. 
Talbot had attended a "daddy-daughter" party with Camille 
Watson's daughter when Mr. Talbot was present (supported at T.74 
1.24-T.75 1.14). The trial court stated that he saw the Watson 
residence every day (supported at T.77 1.1), and that he observed 
Mr. Talbot leaving from the residence several times between 7:00 
a.m. and 8:00 a.m. This is not supported by the record. Mr. 
Hilton testified at T.80 1.16 to T.81 1.6 that he saw Mr. Talbot 
leaving Camille Watson's house at that time once or twice in the 
last couple of years. "Once or twice" is not several, and the 
distinction is important in this case. The trial court then 
correctly stated that Mr. Hilton testified that Mr. Talbot was 
not at Camille Watson's house every day. The trial court then 
stated that Mr. Hilton testified that Mr. Talbot was at Camille 
Watson's house several days at a time, and that he appeared to be 
living there when he was staying there. This is supported at 
T.80 11.1-15. The trial court then found that Mr. Hilton 
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testified that he had that observed Mr. Talbot parked his red 
Corvette and white Pontiac Grand Am in the garage at Camille 
Watson's home. This is generally but not perfectly supported at 
T.76 11.3-25. The trial court then stated that Mr. Hilton 
testified that he saw Mr. Talbot drive Camille Watson's car on 
several occasions. This is not supported by the record. Mr. 
Hilton testified he saw Mr. Talbot in Camille Watson's car while 
she was driving, but not that he saw Mr. Talbot driving her car. 
T. 77 11.22-24. The trial court then found that Mr. Hilton 
testified that he witnessed Mr. Talbot work on Camille Watson's 
house and yard (supported at T.87 11.4-11), go to the mailbox 
(supported at T.78 11.5-7), and wash the cars (supported at T.76 
1.17) , often when Camille Watson was not present. This latter 
statement, that Mr. Talbot did certain things while Camille 
Watson was not present, is not supported in the record. The 
trial court then stated that Mr. Hilton testified that he had 
witnessed Mr. Talbot and Camille Watson riding bicycles together 
(supported at T. 81 11.14-20), and arguing in the garage 
(supported at T.83 11.6-18). The trial court found that Mr. 
Hilton testified he observed Mr. Talbot playing with the Watson 
children in the yard. This is not supported in the record. Mr. 
Hilton testified that he saw the Watson children playing in the 
front yard, but not that Mr. Talbot was present. T.78 1.20. The 
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trial court then stated that Mr. Hilton expressed his opinion 
that Jerry Talbot was living at Camille Watson's home during the 
period of December 1994 to November 1995. There is no support 
for this in the record. Mr. Hilton expressed no such opinion. 
Mr. Hilton only testified as follows: 
THE WITNESS: I would say, from my point of view, 
that when he's there I would assume he lives there. 
When he's not there I don't know where he lives. 
Q. (Mr. Greenwood) Okay. You say " . . . when he 
lives there." What do you mean by ". . . when he lives 
there"? 
A. Well, I would say that when he is there he 
parks in the garage and goes in the house and is there 
for a few days. I would assume that means he is living 
there. 
T.80 11.7-15. It is clear that all Mr. Hilton was saying was 
that Mr. Talbot sometimes stays at Camille Watson's residence for 
a few days then leaves, to come back sometime in the future. It 
is not reasonable that the trial court could have concluded from 
this that Mr. Hilton was expressing his opinion that Mr. Talbot 
lived at Camille Watson's house from December 1994 to November 
1995. 
The trial court next summarized the testimony of Russell 
12 
Ware, a United States Postal Service employee, at R.240. Mr. 
Ware did not appear in person to testify, rather his testimony 
was offered by affidavit, Plaintiff's Exhibit #6. The affidavit 
stated in general terms that Mr. Ware has delivered mail; to Mr. 
Talbot at 1668 North 3 90 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah on an 
occasional basis since early 1995. No specific information as to 
what was delivered and when was provided. 
The next witness whose testimony the trial court summarized 
is Mr. Talbot. However, he was not the next witness after 
admission of Mr. Ware's affidavit. The next witness after Mr. 
Ware was Shauna Farnsworth. Her testimony is summarized after 
that of Mr. Talbot. 
The trial court's characterization of Mr. Talbot's testimony 
will be deemed correct with the following exceptions. First, the 
trial court states at R.239 that Mr. Talbot testified that he 
always parks his car in the garage which is accessed by a garage 
door opener. This does not accurately characterize Mr. Talbot's 
testimony. Mr. Talbot testified that he parks his Corvette in 
Camille Watson's garage (T.150 1.23 to T.151 1.3), and that when 
he visits with Camille Watson at her house he sometimes has 
possession of a garage door opener, but that it is "not a 
permanent fixture in any of [his] vehicles." T.128 1.11 to T.129 
1.5) . Mr. Talbot also testified that he does not always have the 
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garage door opener with him. Id. 
Several other witnesses testified, and the trial court 
characterized or summarized their testimony as well. Some other 
errors, or points in need of clarification in the trial court's 
summary are as follows. The trial court stated at R.238 that 
Shauna Farnsworth testified that Mr. Talbot was present when she 
and Camille Watson went out jogging in the morning. In reality, 
Shauna Farnsworth testified that while she and Camille Watson go 
jogging about three to four times per week {T.99 1.22), she has 
only seen Mr. Talbot in the home about six times in a two-year 
span (T.101 1.2-3). So in the between 300 and 400 times Shauna 
Farnsworth had gone over to Camille Watson's home in a two-year 
span, she saw Mr. Talbot in the home about six times. 
The trial court characterized Camille Watson's testimony as 
stating that Mr. Talbot has been in her home when she was not 
present, but neglects to mention that she also stated that her 
children were at home on those occasions. T.187 11. 18-20. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion when it made findirrp 
of fact where no support was found in the record, and when it 
made findings that were clearly against the great weight of the 
evidence. The trial court then committed error of law when it 
misapplied the standard set forth in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 
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669 (Utah 1985) to the facts of the case. The trial court's 
order terminating John Watson's alimony obligation and ordering 
that Camille Watson's residence be sold pursuant to the terms of 
the divorce decree should be overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED ERROR IN 
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
The trial court abused its discretion when it found that Mr. 
Talbot and Camille Watson had shared a common residence. The 
testimony of R. Craig Hilton, a neighbor, established only that 
Mr. Talbot appeared to spend up to three nights consecutively at 
Camille Watson's home. The trial court stated that it relied 
heavily on Mr. Hilton's testimony {R.234)
 f but his testimony did 
not establish that Mr. Talbot had spent more than half of his 
nights at Camille Watson's residence. The testimony of the 
private investigator, Mr. Goode, upon which the trial court also 
heavily relied, was substantially impeached on cross-examination. 
The trial court's basis for believing Mr. Goode's testimony over 
that of other witnesses, such as Shauna Farnsworth, a friend of 
Camille Watson who had frequent personal contact with Camille at 
her residence, was that he was an "uninterested party." R.234. 
Mr. Goode was in fact paid $1,500 for his services by Mr. Watson, 
which makes him far from uninterested. The job he was doing for 
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Mr. Watson was essentially to substantiate cohabitation. That 
was essentially the purpose for which he was retained. Mr. Goode 
is not a true professional such a licensed social worker or 
psychologist who might be expected to conduct an independent and 
unbiased investigation of, for example, parents' respective 
qualifications for custody for the benefit of the court. He has 
one paying client, John Watson, and it a case such as this, he is 
expected to find evidence to substantiate cohabitation. 
The trial court apparently did not consider the testimony of 
Shauna Farnsworth, who stated that she only saw Mr. Talbot in 
Camille Watson's house around six times in two years, when she 
was visiting her house three to four times per week. In fact, of 
all the witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing, only 
Mr. Goode testified that he saw Mr. Talbot at Camille Watson's 
house every day he conducted surveillance, and that testimony was 
shown to be false on cross examination. In fact, Mr. Talbot did 
not conduct personal surveillance every day, and even on days 
when he did conduct surveillance, Mr. Talbot was not always 
there. (See citations in Statement of Facts section.) 
Among the errors the trial court made in its findings of 
fact, which were pointed out in the Statement of Facts section, 
supra, are the following. The trial court stated that Mr. Hilton 
saw Mr. Talbot leave for work from Camille Watson's residence 
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several times between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. This is not 
supported by the record. Mr. Hilton testified at T.80 1.16 to 
T.81 1.6 that he saw Mr. Talbot leaving Camille Watson's house at 
that time once or twice in the last couple of years. "Once or 
twice" is not several, and, as stated earlier, the distinction is 
important in this case. What the actual testimony of Mr. Hilton 
showed is that it was very rare indeed for him to see Mr. Talbot 
leaving for work from Camille Watson's house, despite the fact 
that he had the opportunity to observe her house each morning. 
Another serious and material error the trial court committed 
in its characterization of Mr. Hilton's testimony is that the 
trial court stated that Mr. Hilton expressed his opinion that 
Jerry Talbot was living at Camille Watson's home during the 
period of December 1994 to November 1995. Mr. Hilton expressed 
no such opinion, and stated only that while Mr. Talbot was 
staying at Camille Watson's house for a few days, he appeared to 
be living there. That opinion, even had it been correctly 
stated, should have been given little weight, since it is clear 
Mr. Hilton was not testifying as to the legal standard for 
residency, and his opinion was not very material to the issue of 
residency. 
It is also significant that Mr. Hilton testified that there 
were times when he had not seen Mr. Talbot for periods of weeks. 
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T.90 11.7-9. 
There were other errors in the trial court's findings which 
were set forth in the Statement of Facts section, and while 
individually they were not highly material, the cumulative effect 
of them is material because all the other errors were prejudicial 
to Camille Watson. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE PRINCIPLES OF HADDOW V. 
HADDOW 
In addition to committing an abuse of discretion in 
mischaracterizing the testimony and in its weighing of the 
testimony, the trial court also erred in its application of the 
facts of this case to the standard set forth in Haddow v. Haddow, 
707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
test for cohabitation for purposes of terminating alimony and 
enforcing an equitable lien in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 
(Utah 1985)1. The court held there were two key elements to be 
considered in determining whether a party is cohabiting: common 
residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association. 
In applying Haddow, the trial court must determine whether 
as a matter of law whether the third party and the ex-spouse have 
common residency. The Utah Supreme Court in Haddow affirmed 
definition of "common residency" set forth in Knuteson v. 
1
 Accord Sigcr v. Sigg, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah Ct. App., 
October 26, 1995) . 
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Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980), which is the sharing of a 
common abode that both parties consider their principle domicile 
for more than a brief period of time. Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672, 
citing Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1389. Haddow also held that the 
abode must be "settled," and a stay of two months and ten days 
did not qualify as settled. Id. The court in Haddow set forth 
factors the trial court is to consider in determining whether the 
residency requirement has been met. They are as follows: that 
the stay be more than temporary2; that the party and the third 
person share common expenses; that the furniture or personal 
belongings of the third person be found in the home of the party; 
that they share assets or have joint bank accounts or 
liabilities; that they jointly own property; that they reside 
together continuously for sustained periods of time; that the 
third person have free access to the party's residence and may 
come and go and he may please, as opposed to the third person 
schedule his visits to coincide with the presence of the person 
he is visiting. 
The trial court in the instant case failed to establish 
enough of the factors for it to conclude that the residency 
requirement had been meet. Testimony showed that Mr. Talbot had 
2
 See Knuteson v. Knuteson. 619 P.2d 1387, 1389(Utah 1980), 
where the court held that a stay of two months and ten days did 
not establish a "settled abode." 
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not moved his furniture, clothing, or any of his personal 
belongings into Camille Watson's residence, with the exception of 
a television set and a stereo set. No evidence suggests that Mr. 
Talbot stored clothing or other personal effects there. The 
evidence also established that Jerry Talbot and Camille Watson 
had no joint credit, and that they had no joint checking 
accounts. In fact, they had not commingled their finances in any 
meaningful way. The trial court points out that Mr. Talbot did 
not have a bank account, but that it not material to the issue of 
commingling. The evidence presented at the hearing also 
established that Jerry Talbot and Camille Watson have no joint 
property of any kind. The evidence presented at the hearing also 
established that Camille Watson has paid from her own proceeds 
all living expenses expended on behalf of her or the minor 
children issue of these parties, including the payment of the 
mortgage, utilities (gas, water, electricity), and food for the 
children, with exception of a few times when Mr. Talbot bought 
food when he was going to be with Defendant and her children at 
her residence. Furthermore, no evidence was presented that 
Camille Watson and Jerry Talbot hold themselves out to the 
general public that they reside in the same residence. 
The greater weight of the evidence, taking the testimony of 
Mr. Hilton, Mrs. Farnsworth, Camille Watson, Mr. Talbot, Rowella 
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Talbot, and other witnesses showed that Camille Watson and Jerry 
Talbot have not resided continuously for sustained periods of 
time. The evidence also showed that Camille Watson's residence 
was not the primary residence of Jerry Talbot. Jerry Talbot had 
spent the night frequently at Camille Watson's home, but it was 
not established that he spent most of his nights there, that he 
received most or even a substantial portion of his mail there, or 
that he did his laundry there. 
The trial court simply did not establish the requisite 
elements of residency. Furthermore, the evidence relating to 
sexual contact was very circumstantial. The trial court seems to 
rely heavily on the empty condom box found in the trash by Mr. 
Goode. However, when John Watson's counsel questioned Mr. Talbot 
about it, he never asked him if he used the condoms while at 
Camille Watson's house. He only asked him if he had ever used 
condoms like the ones which the box apparently had contained, and 
Mr. Talbot responded that he did not know. It should be pointed 
out that Camille Watson has a sixteen-year-old son living with 
her, and it is possible the box could have belonged to him, 
without suggesting that that was the case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion and committed error of 
law in applying the test of Haddow v. Haddow (cited infra). 
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Therefore, the trial court's order terminating John Watson's 
alimony obligation and ordering that Camille Watson's residence 
be sold pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree should be 
overturned. The appellant, Camille Watson, should be awarded her 
costs and attorney fees incurred in defending against John 
Watson's order to show cause and incurred in this appeal. 
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